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COMMENT
PER SE ILLEGALITY AND CONCERTED
REFUSALS TO DEAL
ALLEN C. HORSLEY*
The Supreme Court has always treated concerted refusals to deal
and group boycotts as being per se illegal. In its early decisions' regard-
ing the restraints imposed on trade by such refusals and boycotts, the
Court disregarded justifications resting on the reasonableness of the
restraint; however, in all of these cases, the Court either found or
inferred a primary intent to curtail competition before rejecting argu-
ments of reasonability. In more recent decisions,' where the facts
revealed restraints that clearly curtailed a mode of competition or a
competitor, the Court has found it unnecessary to discuss intent and
has adopted a strict per se approach. Consequently, concerted refusals
to deal have been regarded as illegal without inquiry into their reason-
ability or justification.' It is the basic contention of this comment, how-
ever, that the strict per se approach taken by the Supreme Court does
not preclude the application of the rule of reason to those concerted
refusals to deal or group boycotts' whose primary intent or major effect
is not anticompetitive. Recent lower federal court decisions' support
* B.A., Harvard University, 1963; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1966; LL.M,
George Washington University, 1971; Member of the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Good-
win, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Massachusetts.
1 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Associated
Press v. United States, 236 U.S. 1 (1945); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
2 Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
a Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) (sub-
stituted opinion). In Ford Motor, the court held that policy agreements between an auto
manufacturer and its dealers not to sell new "factory" models to used car dealers were
per se violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 883. In so holding, the court stated:
We find that the . . . [General Motors] . . . decision . . . [the most recent Su-
preme Court decision on the illegality of concerted refusals to deal] puts to rest
any contention that a manufacturer, through agreements with its dealers, may
seek to exclude a class of competitors from the market in the name of preserving
a system of distribution.
Id. at 882.
4 A group boycott is actually the means of effectuating a concerted refusal to deal.
Because of the difficulty involved in making a significant distinction between the two,
and since the Supreme Court has treated them interchangeably, this comment will do the
same.
5 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th
Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tyson Corner Regional
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this thesis and have limited the per se doctrine by applying the test of
reasonableness to those restraints whose primary objective is arguably
not anticompetitive. The comment will discuss this recent lower federal
court development after an initial analysis of the more significant
Supreme Court group boycott decisions.
I. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S PER SE
RULE
In 1914, the Supreme Court in Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Association v. United States' held to be per se illegal the
circulation, among a retailers' association, of lists of "offending" whole-
salers selling directly to consumers. The Court noted that the circula-
tion of blacklists had, and was intended to have, an anticompetitive
effect. As a result of the circulation, retailers would withhold their
patronage from the listed wholesalers in an attempt to coerce them to
curtail their retail selling.? The Court determined that the involuntary
restriction on the trade of the wholesalers placed the practice not in
the category of "agreements in aid of trade ... which may be found not
to be within the [Sherman Act]" ... but "within the prohibited class
of undue and unreasonable restraints. . . ." 8 The objective sought in
circulating the lists of "offending" wholesalers was clearly and solely
anticompetitive, so that once the restraining effect on competing whole-
salers was demonstrated, the Court had little difficulty in categorizing
the restraint as illegal per se.
Eastern States was cited by the Supreme Court in Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC° to show that the organized
boycott in the latter case violated the Sherman Act. In Fashion Origi-
nators', a women's garment manufacturers' association had established
a scheme allegedly to protect members and society at large from the
harm resulting from the copying, by competitors, of members' original
designs. This scheme entailed, among other procedures, the boycotting
of retailers who bought design copies at discount prices." In condemn-
Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;
Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywoods Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D.C. Ore.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969) ;
Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd,
313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) ; United States v. Insurance
Ed., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
234 U.S. 600 (1914).
7 Id. at 609.
8 Id. at 612-13.
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
10 Id. at 462. In order to identify the design copiers and the retailers who bought
from them, the association required the registration of designs and the inspection of
plants, books and products. In addition, various disciplinary schemes were established,
including heavy fines imposed on members caught dealing with copiers or their retail
buyers. Id. at 462-63.
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ing this refusal of association members to deal with retail buyers of the
copied designs, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous Court,
stated:
The purpose and object of this combination, its potential
power, its tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did
practice upon a rival method of competition, all brought it
within the policy of the prohibition declared by the Sherman
. . . [Act]. . . . Under these circumstances it was not error to
refuse to hear the evidence offered, for the reasonableness of
the methods pursued by the combination to accomplish its
unlawful object is no more material than would be the reason-
ableness of the prices fixed by unlawful combination."
In holding that the reasonableness of the boycott was not a rele-
vant consideration, Justice Black implied that the boycott was per se
illegal; yet he was careful to qualify this holding by stressing that the
reasonability of the method was irrelevant when the purpose was shown
to be anticompetitive. Fashion Originators' remained the most impor-
tant group boycott case for some time. Its rule appeared to be clear
enough: any group boycott intended to suppress a competitor or a
mode of competition was per se violative of the Sherman Act, and
could not be justified by any purported business or social benefit.
Eastern States and Fashion Originators' both involved attempts
to coerce third parties to conform to a desirable standard of commercial
conduct in order that the boycotters would be faced with less competi-
tion. The parties boycotted were being coerced to give up a voluntary
trade practice through an involuntary restraint on their trading oppor-
tunity. The coercion was exercised in both cases in order to lessen
competition. These decisions indicate, then, that a group boycott should
be held per se illegal when it is used primarily to exclude or coerce a
third party in order to curtail competition."
It is submitted that these decisions do not preclude application of
the rule of reason test. Rather, a concerted refusal to deal or group
boycott that is not used primarily to coerce or exclude in order to lessen
competition should be tested by the rule of reason in order to determine
whether it results in an unreasonable restraint in light of its primary
objective." Such an approach, it is submitted, would recognize the fine
yet crucial distinction between a refusal to deal used to lessen competi-
tion and one used as a method of competing. A refusal to deal with a
party might not be aimed primarily at lessening competition but rather
11 Id. at 467-68 (emphasis added).
12
 See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 847, 875 (1955).
13 Id. at 876.
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may be the result Of a; business agreement as to how a joint Undertaking
can best be operated.
However, in Associated Press v. United States," the Supreme
Court did not recognize this distinction. Rather, it looked to the effect
on competition of a concerted refusal to deal. Where that effect was
marked, the Court either ignored the purpose behind the refusal or
inferred an anticompetitive motive to find the refusal per se illegal. In
Associated Press, bylaws of the Associated Press (AP) which had
prohibited association members from transmitting news to nonmembers
and from furnishing spontaneous news to nonmembers were held to be,
on their face, unlawful restraints of trade." In its opinion, the Court
did not refer to the restraint occasioned by the association's bylaws
either as a group boycott or as a concerted refusal to deal. However,
the Supreme Court in subsequent cases" cited Associated Press to show
that group boycotts were per se illegal.
The restraint in Associated Press differs significantly from the
more frequent commercial group boycott where two or more parties in
the manufacturer—wholesaler--retailer chain conspire in order to
lessen competition, to exclude another party in that chain from a mar-
ket, or to coerce action by that party. The Associated Press was a
cooperative association engaged in gathering and distributing news.
The association members' primary purpose in joining was to further
their news business, not to curtail competition. Hence the restraint on
the nonmember news business caused by the AP bylaws was not a pur-
pose but rather a result of the members' accepting a limitation on their
freedom to deal with nonmembers as part of an overall agreement to
further their business. However, it was just this effect—the surrender-
ing of an individual publisher's freedom to dispose of news as he saw
fit—that the Supreme Court seized upon as an indication that the
resulting restraint should not be tested by the rule of reason."
As regards the Court's consideration of effect, Associated Press is
consistent with both Eastern States and Fashion Originators'. In
Eastern States, the effect of circulating a blacklist to retailers was to
discourage them from dealing with the "offending" wholesalers and
thereby to curtail the retailers' freedom to trade with the wholesalers.
In Fashion Originators', the rules of the association of garment manu-
facturers' were established to identify "offending" retailers so that
members could stop trading with them. Despite this similarity in effect,
however, the element of motive to coerce a third party to take or to
14 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
15 Id. at 12.
10 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 552 (1948); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
17 326 U.S. at 19.
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avoid some action, so evident in Eastern Statei and Fashion Origi-
nators', was absent in Associated Press. The bylaws were not aimed
specifically at any one group in an attempt to induce conduct that
would lessen competition. Rather, they were designed to promote the
news business of the association's members. Thus the coercive intent
that characterized the garment manufacturers' scheme in Fashion
Originators' was clearly not present in Associated Press. The Court,
however, apparently determined that while coercive intent was not
evident, anticompetitive intent could be inferred from the effect the
bylaws had exerted on competing publishers." The effect of the bylaws
was found to be so significantly anticompetitive that, despite other
purported reasons for the bylaws, they were held per se illegal.
The Associated Press decision, then, could have been interpreted
in subsequent decisions to mean that concerted refusals having sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects would be per se illegal. This interpreta-
tion still would have left room for application of the rule of reason to
those refusals that did not have substantial anticompetitive effects and
that may have been motivated by other than anticompetitive considera-
tions. Furthermore, Eastern States and Fashion Originators' suggest
that it is the inherently coercive nature of a group boycott which makes
the combination per se illegal. Since coercion was not present in Associ-
ated Press, the possibility remained for application of the rule of reason
to concerted refusals to deal. As applied, this would mean that a con-
certed refusal to deal not involving coercion and not having substantial
anticompetitive effects would be examined in order to determine whether
it unreasonably excluded the object of that refusal from the trade in
question.
Such an approach to concerted refusals to deal, however, was
apparently foreclosed by the Supreme Court on two occasions. In
United States v. Columbia Steel Co.," the Court cited Associated Press
together with three other group boycott cases" to show that a concerted
refusal to deal with nonmembers of an association was per se illegal.
Furthermore, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 2 ' the
Court stated that "group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal .. .
18 Id. at 13. The Court stated:
Inability to buy news from the largest news agency [AP], or any one of its
multitude of members, can have most serious effects on the publication of competi-
tive newspapers both those presently published, and those which, but for these
restrictions, might be published in the future.
Id.
11) 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
20 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Montague & Company v.
Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
21 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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clearly run afoul of § 1 [of the Sherman Act] . . . "22 and cited Associ-
ated Press, Columbia Steel and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc.,28 for that proposition. In Columbia Steel and .Times-
Picayune the Court apparently attempted to foreclose the possibility
of using the rule of reason approach in concerted refusal to deal-
group boycott situations.
In these decisions the Court also intermingled cases with distinctly
different types of restraints. Associated Press, with its exclusionary
bylaws, was placed beside Kiefer-Stewart, which involved a traditional
commercial group boycott aimed solely at coercing anticompetitive
action. In Kief er-Stewart, the Supreme Court held per se illegal a con-
certed refusal to deal by two liquor producers who had agreed not to
sell to a wholesaler unless he consented to their maximum resale price."
Since the price fixing motive of this refusal to deal was clearly anti-
competitive, the holding in Kiefer-Stewart is consistent with Eastern
States and Fashion Originators'. In the latter two cases the primary
motive for the defendant's actions, as noted above, was also clearly
anticompetitive. However, the per se language of the Court° in its
short opinion in Kiefer-Stewart dealt primarily with the illegality of
any agreement to fix prices, not with the nature of the refusal to deal.
Despite its primary emphasis on price-fixing, Kiel er-Stewart was cited
by the Supreme Court in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,' a
landmark decision concerning group boycotts, to show that concerted
refusals to deal have long been considered per se illegal."
II. Klor's AND ITS PROGENY
The Supreme Court cases prior to Klor's indicated that a group
boycott would be held per se illegal only after an examination of the
facts showed that the boycott had or was intended to have a substantial
effect on competition. In this sense, the rule could be considered a
limited per se rule. The Court would disregard affirmative justifications
for a group boycott only after a detrimental effect on competition had
22 Id. at 625.
23 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
24 Id. at 214.
24 Id. at 213. In the only reference to per se illegality in the opinion, the Court
stated:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors
to fix maximum resale prices . . . does not violate the Sherman Act. For such
agreements . . . cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability
to sell in accordance with their own judgment. . . . "Under the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate . . . com-
merce is illegal per se."
20 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
27 Id. at 212.
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been shown. Since the existence of the group boycott itself was not
considered to be per se injurious to competition, the Court had found
it necessary to evaluate the purpose and effect of the restraint. Klor's,
however, changed that approach. There the Court held that neither an
injurious effect on competition nor an anticompetitive motive was essen-
tial in order to find a group boycott per se illegal.
In Klor's the plaintiff, a discount appliance retailer, alleged that
a retailer for a department store chain in competition with him and ten
appliance manufacturers and their distributors had conspired among
themselves to boycott his business in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act." The plaintiff alleged that the distributors would not
sell to him or would sell to him only at discriminatory rates and that he
was thereby damaged." The plaintiff did not allege that the defendants
had had an anticompetitive motive in boycotting him or that there had
been any detrimental effect on competition, except for his injury. The
sole defense proffered was that the activity had not resulted in any
damage to competition and that, consequently, it was not proscribed
by the Sherman Act." To support this contention the defendants
submitted affidavits showing that there were numerous other dealers
in the immediate neighborhood selling the same appliances that the
defendants had refused to sell to Klor's. 31
 The district court concluded
that the boycott of Klor's was a purely private quarrel not amounting
to a "public wrong" proscribed by the Sherman Act." The Ninth
Circuit affirmed," stating that the "public injury" required for a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act was not present since there was no allegation
or proof either that the market had been affected or that there had been
any intent or purpose to affect the market." The Supreme Court, how-
ever, found the boycott per se illegal and stressed both the inherent
monopolistic tendency of the boycott and the extent of the restraint
on the manufacturers' and distributors' freedom to sell." The Court
28 Id. at 208.
29 Id. at 209. The plaintiff also alleged that the boycott had seriously handicapped
its ability to compete and caused a loss of profits, goodwill and requtation. Id.
80 Id. at 210.
31
 Id. at 210-11. See Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts under the Sherman Act: Some
Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1165 (1959), for a thorough analysis of
the Klor's decision.-
32 The trial court ruling was unrecorded.
33 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
34 Id. at 230.
35 Id. at 212-13. The Court stated:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals . . . to deal . . . have long been
held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations
that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances • . . [The defendants'
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held the boycott per, se illegal . even though' the victim was only one
small business whose demise would not have a substantial economic
effect. 3° Affidavits showing the lack of effect of the boycott on competi-
tion were considered irrelevant.
Thus, the Klor's Court interpreted the per se doctrine to mean
that group boycotts by their nature are injurious to competition. This
interpretation is significantly different from the limited per se approach
taken in Eastern States and in Fashion Originators', where the Court
had determined that affirmative justifications were irrelevant when the
boycott was intented to or did substantially affect competition. Klor's
involved a commercial group boycott whose single purpose was to ex-
clude one retailer. The Court, however, failed to distinguish this type
of boycott from a concerted refusal to deal whose objective might not
be solely to exclude. The Klor's Court also failed to show clearly why
group boycotts are so inherently injurious to competition that they
foreclose consideration of any justification and why the evidence of
lack of effect on competition was considered irrelevant."
Soon after Klor's the Supreme Court decided Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.," in which the plaintiff had
alleged that a refusal by the American Gas Association (AGA) to ap-
prove his gas burners," and a subsequent refusal by other defendants
to supply gas to purchasers of his disapproVed burners, constituted
an illegal group boycott. Six members of the AGA, who were competi-
tors of the plaintiff, were joined with the AGA as defendants.' The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint
on the grounds that the allegations failed to establish a per se illegal
group boycott:" The court also noted that in the absence of a per se
violation, a Sherman Act violation can be found only when there is
general injury to the competitive process. Since the plaintiff failed to
allege public injury, the court could not find such a violation. 42
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision, stressing
that the defendants' refusal to provide gas to purchasers of the plain-
86 359 U.S. at 213. The Court stated in this regard that
[m]onopoly can surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one
at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In recognition of this
fact the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all contracts and
combinations "which tend to create a monopoly."
87 See Rohl, supra note 31, at 1167, for discussion concerning this point.
88 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
80 Id. at 657. The AGA tested gas burners and issued its seal of approval if the
burners passed the test.
40 Id. at 657 n.1. The other association members joined as defendants were either
pipeline companies or gas distributors.
41 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 201
(7th Cir. 1960).
42 Id. at 200.
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tiff's burners was clearly illegal, even without proof of public injury."
With strong'reliance on the language of Klor's, the Court stated:
As to these classes of restraints [which by their nature or char-
acter are unduly restrictive] . . . it . is not for the courts to
decide whether in an individual case injury . . . occurred. . . .
The alleged conspiratorial refusal to provide gas for use in
plaintiff's . . . [burners] . . . clearly has, by its "nature" and
"character," a "monopolistic tendency." 44
Thus the Court in Radiant Burners followed the more expansive per
se rule used in Klor's when it held that the effect of a restraint on the
competitive process was immaterial to a finding of per se illegality.
However, the Court noted, as it had in Klor's that the obvious effect
of the boycott was to curtail greatly the plaintiff's ability to compete."
Furthermore, by emphasizing the restraint's inherent monopolistic
tendency, the Court found the nexus between competition and restraint
that is necessary for a Sherman Act violation.
The defendant's intent in Radiant Burners clearly was not to
coerce a course of action that would lessen competition. If the defen-
dant's intent was anticompetitive, it must have been to exclude the
plaintiff from the market. The Court failed to discuss intent—ap-
parently determining that anticompetitive intent could be inferred, as
it had been in Associated Press, from the obvious result of the boycott.
In failing to discuss intent, the Court avoided facing the possibility
that the primary intent of the AGA may not have been anticompetitive,
but may have been to further the business interests of its members.
The AGA was certainly a different type of combination than that in
Klor's. The AGA's motives in refusing to approve the plaintiff's
burners, and in enforcing the standardization program with a refusal
to provide gas to purchasers of the plaintiff's burners, may have been
to improve the quality of gas burners being sold to the public so as
to enhance their business collectively; or the motive may have been to
insure that only safe gas burners were sold to the public. Yet without
considering the possibility of diverse motives, without finding a primary
intent to restrain, the Court struck down the restrictive method used,
as it had in Associated Press, as being per se illegal.
In United States v. General Motors Corp., 4° a recent classic refusal
43 364 U.S. at 660.
44 Id.
48 Id. at 659. The Court stated:
It is obvious that [the plaintiff] ... cannot sell its gas burners, whatever may
be their virtues, if, because of the alleged conspiracy, the purchasers cannot buy
gas for use in those burners.
Id.
46 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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to deal case," the Supreme Court relied upon both Fashion Originators'
and Klor's to support its finding of per se illegality. In this case, several
associations of auto dealers and General Motors had conducted a joint
scheme to eliminate the sale of new cars to discount outlets." Part of
this scheme involved General Motors' obtaining and enforcing promises
from all the dealers in the area not to deal with the discounters." The
Court relied heavily on Klor's to show that concerted elimination of
the discounters from the market was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act,5° and upon Fashion Originators' to show that certain anticompeti-
tive practices are presumed to be illegal without inquiry into the precise
harm they cause or into any possible business justification for their
use.61
47 In 1963, the Supreme Court arguably further expanded the per se rule con-
cerning group boycotts in Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). In that case,
despite the fact that the party refusing to deal was not in competition in the same market
with the object of its refusal, and without any discussion of intent, the Supreme Court
found the refusal per se illegal. Id. at 348.
In Silver, the New York Stock Exchange had refused to approve for the plaintiff, an
over-the-counter securities dealer, a private telemeter connection with several members of
the Exchange. The Exchange had denied the plaintiff's application because of his failure
to disclose fully information the Exchange considered relevant to his application. Silver
v. N.Y. Stock Exch., .302 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1962). After this denial, however, Exchange
members remained willing to deal with the plaintiff for the purchase and sale of se-
curities. In finding a per se violation, the CoUrt stated that the collective denial of a
service essential to the plaintiff's effective competition with others was sufficient to create
a violation of the Sherman Act. 376 U.S. at 349 n.5.
Silver appears to be a clear departure not only from the per se rationale developed
in Eastern States and Fashion Originators', where the Court was primarily concerned with
finding a coercive intent, but also from that developed in Klor's, Radiant Burners, and
Associated Press, where the illegal combination was at least partially composed of mem-
bers who were directly competing with the object of the refusal. In the latter cases, it
was possible to infer an anticompetitive intent because those comprising the illegal
combination appeared to benefit competitively vis-a-vis the object of the refusal. This
was not possible in Silver because the Exchange and its members were not directly com-
peting with the plaintiff, an over-the-counter, securities dealer. In a fashion similar to
that of the Court in Radiant Burners, the Court stressed the obvious curtailment in the
plaintiff's business resulting from the Exchange's refusal and noted how essential the
service provided by those refusing to deal was to the plaintiff's business existence. The
Court's holding, however, was overshadowed by its discussion of antitrust immunity. Id.
at 349-67. The defendants contended that the nature of the self-regulation imposed upon
them by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exempted them from antitrust proscription.
After a long, detailed analysis of the Exchange's powers under the Act, the Court con-
cluded that the Exchange was not immune. Id. at 360-61.
48 384 U.S. at 137.
49 Id. at 136. In order to police these agreements not to do business with discounters,
General Motors obtained information about violations from dealers and their trade
associations and confronted the "violating" dealers with this information. The dealers had
to repurchase the cars, sometimes at a substantial loss, and had to promise to stop such
sales. Id. at 137.
60 Id. at 145.
51
 Id. at 146-47. The Court further noted that the success of the joint scheme would
lead to a substantial restraint upon price competition—an illegal objective when effected
by a concerted effort. Id. at 147.
493.
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It fs submitted, however, that the facts of-General Motors permit
the decision there to be interpreted as a limited rather than- strict per
se doctrine. The boycotting dealers were in direct competition with
the discounters and sought to enhance or protect their market position
by eliminating the discount outlets. Both the, intent and the desired
effect of the refusals to deal were clearly anticompetitive. On the basis
of either the Eastern States-Fashion Originators' per se rationale—an
intent to lessen competition—or the Associated Press-Klor's-Radiant
Burners rationale--a detrimental effect upon competitors-7the restraint
in General Motors was properly held per se illegal.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RULE OF REASON APPROACH:
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
A. The Importance of Anticompetitive Intent
In Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,' the plaintiff
sought an injunction against a fire insurance company for allegedly
conspiring with a testing laboratory, Underwriters Laboratories, in
restraint of trade. Underwriters had refused to test Roofire's fire alarms
or to publish the test results, claiming that Roofire's product failed to
comply with its standards for testing." The thrust of Roofire's claim
was that the defendants had conspired together to set standards that
would render the plaintiff's product ineligible for testing. 0 Roofire
alleged that, as a result of Underwriters' refusal to test, it had been
unable to advertise its product in certain media, and that its product
had suffered a consequent reduction in marketability. The district
court rejected Roofire's claim on two grounds. It first noted that neither
the defendant insurer nor. Underwriters produced or sold fire alarms
or was in any other way a commercial competitor of Roofire." Second,
the court stated that there was no evidence showing that the setting of
standards by Underwriters was for any unlawful or improper purpose."
The court concluded that any change in market conditions brought
about by an association formed to foster high standards, lessen trade
evils and encourage fair competition was not an "undue restraint" on
trade."
62 202 F. Supp. 166 (ED. Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 949 (1963).
53 202 F. Supp. at 167. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. was sponsored by a national
association of approximately two hundred fire insurance companies. It engaged in testing
products, materials and devices as to their safety and fitness for use regarding fire,
casualty and crime prevention. Underwriters received no income from the sale of products
it had tested; it was supported primarily by the fees charged for conducting tests. Id. at
168.
54 Id. at 167.
56
 Id. at 168.
W. Id. at 169.
67 Id.
494
PER SE ILLEGALITY AND CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL.
The absence of anticompetitive intent was the crucial factor in
this decision. The plaintiff was not competing with either defendant,
so that anticompetitive intent could not be inferred from the defend-
ants' actions. In stressing the importance of anticompetitive intent
for a finding of illegality, the court followed the approach taken by
the Supreme Court in Eastern States and Fashion Originators'. In those
cases possible business justifications for the restraint had not been
considered because the primary purpose behind the restraint was to
hinder competition. In Roo fire, the absence of anticompetitive intent
allowed justification of the refusal to deal on the basis of the benefits
derived from UnderWriters' laboratory testing program." The fact
that the plaintiff did not compete with either defendant also distin-
guished Roofire from both Associated Press and Radiant Burners. In
those cases, anticompetitive intent had been inferred from the evident
effect the defendants' action had on competitors and, consequently, on
the defendants' market position. In Roofire, the defendants' action
could not obtain for them a larger share of the market even though it
hampered the plaintiff's marketing program and so made it more diffi-
cult for him to compete with producers of similar products.
Roo fire, then, appears to imply that in the absence of anticompeti-
tive intent, when a refusal to deal by product evaluators, not competi-
tors, has only a limited effect on the trade of the object of the refusal,
the court will examine the justifications for the refusal in order to
determine their reasonableness. This limited rule of reason approach
was broadened in Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood
Association" to include a refusal to deal by competitors of the object
of that refusal.
In Structural, a trade association organized primarily to promote
the sale of plywood" refused to grant its seal of approval to Struc-
tural's plywood because it did not meet certain commercial standards
published by the United States Department of Commerce.n The plain-
58 See generally Wachtel, Product Standards and Certification Programs, 13 Anti-
trust Bull. 1 (1968), for a discussion of the antitrust implications of a testing laboratory's
refusal to test.
58
 261 F. Supp. 154 (D.C. Ore. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
08
 261 F. Supp. at 155. The Douglas Fir Plywood Association derived its income
from dues paid by members in proportion to the amount of plywood they produced.
During the years relevant to the suit, the association's members manufactured approxi-
mately 85% of all domestically produced plywdod. Approximately 21% of the associa-
tion's four to five million dollar annual budget was spent on technical activities, including
an extensive quality control program; this program called for the inspection' of members'
plants and the sampling of their plywood. Those members who met both the association's
quality control standards and commercial standards published by the U.S. Department
of Commerce were allowed use of the association's stamp and certificate. Id. at 155-56.
01
 15 C.F.R. § 10 (1971). This section sets forth procedures by which new standards
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tiff alleged that the trade association, which could propose and approve
changes to these standards, used them in violation of Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act to prevent the sale of its plywood B 2 The associa-
tion refused to certify that Structural's plywood met the commercial
standards and also refused repeated requests by the plaintiff to effect
a . change in these standards, despite demonstrations by the plaintiff
that its product was superior ,in certain respects to the standardized
plywood."
The district court dismissed Structural's suit, holding that the
association's refusals to grant plaintiff's requests for certification and
for a change in standards were neither unreasonable nor made with an
intent to restrain trade. The court determined that the experience of
one manufacturer, Structural, in demonstrating that its product had
superior qualities, was an insufficient basis upon which it should
conclude that the association was obliged to reform its standards." As
to the reasonability of the association's actions, the court stated:
Any system of standards pre-supposes that there are standard
and non-standard items. Those who produce products which
are not standard are to some extent penalized and trade is to
some extent restrained. This much however is congressionally
sanctioned" and the court is of the opinion that in the absence
of a bad purpose, mistakes made in the formulation or main-
tenance of standards do not subject the one making the mis-
take to anti-trust liability."
By characterizing the association's refusal to appreciate changes
in the standards as a "mistake," the court eliminated the possibility of
finding or inferring an intentional purpose on the defendant's part to
suppress competition from Structural. Having eliminated the factor of
anticompetitive intent, the court then evaluated the defendant's actions
may be recommended to the Department of Commerce, and approved or rejected by
private trade organizations.
02 . 261 F. Supp. at 155. This charge was based in large part on the fact that the
commercial standards in effect during the time the plaintiff attempted to gain access to
the market excluded the plaintiff's plywood as being of unacceptable construction. Two
years following the plaintiff's financial collapse, the commercial standards were changed,
at the behest of the association, to include the plaintiff's plywood as being of acceptable
construction. Id. at 156-57.
tia Id. at 157-58. See Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative
Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1486 (1966), for a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the role of the antitrust laws vis-a-vis the exclusionary practices of private organi-
zations.
• 04 Id. at 158.
9 6 The court
.
:here, refers to 15 U.S.C. 	 272 (1964), in which the Secretary of
Commerce was granted authority to develop and, publish standards for materials used by
the government, and industry.. 	 .au 261 F. Supp. at 159..:
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in order to determine whether they had unreasonably restrained the
sale of the plaintiff's plywood. Despite the per se approach taken by
the Supreme Court in Radiant Burners, which also had involved a
refusal to deal by a trade association made up of competitors of the
plaintiff, the Structural court applied the test of reasonableness to the
association's refusal to deal. This approach could possibly be justified
by the fact that the defendant's actions carried the benefit of "quasi-
legislative" approval.
However, in light of the per se approach taken in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange" which involved action allegedly taken pursuant
to a federal statute,°8 another distinction appears warranted. The degree
of restraint on the object of the refusal appears to be that distinguish-
ing feature. The restraint in Structural was markedly different from
that in Radiant Burners. In Structural, the effect of the association's
refusal to test was to curtail the business opportunities of the plaintiff
by reducing his product's marketability. However, in Radiant Burners,
the refusal to provide gas to the plaintiff's burners would completely
eliminate the plaintiff's business.
The critical importance of anticompetitive intent in the group boy-
cott per se rationale was most recently indicated in Dalmo Sales Co. v.
Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center en
 In that case, the plaintiff,
a discount retailer, alleged that its exclusion from a shopping center
constituted a group boycott and sought a preliminary injunction to
enjoin two major department store tenants from vetoing his tenancy.
The two department stores had exercised the tenant approval rights in
their leases." The District Court for the District of Columbia denied
the injunction on the ground that there was not a substantial likelihood
that the plaintiff would establish the defendant's anticompetitive intent
at trial i 1 The court stated:
67 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Oa Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1 at seq., as amended, 15 U.S.C. 4 78a et seq.:
(1970). See discussion of Silver, note 47 supra.
60 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Rowley and
Donohoe, Antitrust Implications of Tenant Selection Practices in Regional Shopping
Centers: DaImo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 11 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 899 (1970), for a thorough discussion of the Dolma Sales decision.
TO 308 F. Supp. at 992-93. The leases contained provisions granting the department
store the power to veto any prospective tenant of Tysons Corner which was not among
the 465 stores on an approved list. This list included a wide variety of stores. The plain-
tiff, Dalmo, was never proposed for inclusion on this list and consequently was never
vetoed from it. Id. at 990-91.
71 Id. at 995. The court also noted that the heavy financial stake in the success of
the shopping center may give the developer and the department stores the right to select'
tenants who will contribute. to the success of the center without subjecting them to the
per se rule of illegality applied to group boycotts and concerted refusals to. deal. Id. at'
994-95.
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Where there- is absence of•an anticompetitive motive, or where
the anticompetitive motive is not clearly demonstrable, the
legality of a group boycott under the Sherman Act may very
well be subject to test under the rule of reason. . . . Specifi-
cally, the rule of reason may be applicable to boycotts involv-
ing competitors where the motives for exclusion are not
directly profit related.'
The. Dalmo. Sales court was apparently satisfied that the exclusion of
Dalmo had been motivated more by a desire to enhance or maintain
the overall character of the shopping center than by a desire to exclude
a retailer who might offer effective competition through its discounting
practices."
The court was willing to overlook a possible ancillary restraint on
competition in order to accomodate the defendant's business objectives,
which it considered the primary reason for the exclusion. Since the
effect of the veto by two competitors of Dalmo was to exclude com-
pletely Dalmo's competition in the geographical market, the holding
in Dalmo Sales depends entirely upon the lack of a primary motive on
the defendant's part to exclude Dalmo for anticompetitive purposes.
Thus Dalmo Sales probably pushes the rule of reason approach in group
boycott situations to the limits of its applicability." The only significant
difference between Dalmo Sales and Klor's is that the defendants in
Dalmo Sales demonstrated an affirmative business motivation for their
action whereas the defendants in Klor's offered no such justification:
In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd.," where there was neither a lessening of effective competition nor
an intent to restrain, the court properly found the per se rationale not
applicable. In this case, the defendant, a distributor, had prevailed upon
two liquor manufacturers to transfer exclusive distributorships in
Hawaii from the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that
this transfer was a per se illegal group boycott." He further alleged
that both manufacturers knew at the time of the switch that unless both
agreed to make the change, the change would be made by neither. How-
72 Id. at 994. The District of Columbia Circuit, in affirming the district court deci-
sion, fully supported its rationale and extensively quoted the language of the district
court opinion in its own decision. Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping
Center, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
73 308 F. Supp. at 993-95.
74 The Federal Trade Commission has recently issued a proposed complaint against
Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, alleging that the leasing arrangements involved
in Dalmo Sates are unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,720 (1971).
75 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). See, Note, A Return
to the. Rule of Reason in Group Boycott Cases?, 42 U. Cob. L. Rev. 467 (1971).
76 416 F.2d at 74.
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ever, there was no allegation of, nor attempt to show, an agreement
whose primary purpose was either to put the plaintiff out of business,
or to coerce its conduct to conform to any of the defendants' anticom-
petitive objectives."
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the comp.aint, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court decisions involving per
se illegal group boycotts by noting that in those decisions an intent to
destroy a competitor, or to impair his ability to compete, or to accom-
plish another anticompetitive result" had been present. The court held
that since no evidence showed that the defendants were primarily moti-
vated by such an intent,7° the per se group boycott theory was not
applicable. The court also noted that there was neither a net reduction
in the number of competitors nor a lessening of competition.
Hawaiian Oke may be read to stand for the proposition that where
there is neither a primary intent to restrain trade nor any actual lessen-
ing of competition, a concerted refusal to deal will not be considered
per se illegal. The fact that one distributor was substituted for another
and that, therefore, there was no reduction in competition was of critical
importance in Hawaiian Oke. The absence of an adverse effect upon
competition made it easier for the court to conclude that the primary
objective of the manufacturers in changing distributors had been a valid
business one. Thus, while the presence or absence of anticompetitive
intent is important in deciding whether a per se approach will be taken,
the actual impact on competition and the nature and degree of the
restraint must also be considered.
B. The Element of Coercion
In the commercial group boycott cases, Eastern States Fashion
Originators' and Klor's, the Supreme Court had emphasized the boy-
cotts' coercive effect on competition; but the Court's per se rationale
did not depend on that emphasis because in all three cases the single
object of the boycotts was clearly anticompetitive. However, in Asso-
ciated Press and Radiant Burners, where the possibility of diverse
motives existed, the Court's emphasis upon the adverse effect the refusal
had on competition served two important functions. First, it formed the
basis for an inference of anticompetitive intent and second, it high-
lighted the restrictive nature of the resulting restraint. It is submitted,
77 Id.
78 Id. at 77. The court cited Kiefer-Stewart to show that the price-fixing attempt in
that case made the conditional refusal to deal per se illegal and Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), to show that certain exclusionary
practices will be held per se illegal because of their monopolistic effect.
78 Id. at 78. The court noted that the manufacturers had substituted one exclusive
distributor for another for perfectly legitimate business reasons. Id.
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then, that when the exact nature of the intent involved is arguably not
anticompetitive, it is essential for a court's per se rationale to note the
unreasonable nature of the restraint effected. If a court is unable to
discover any unreasonable quality in the restraint, then it may apply
the rule of reason.
The foregoing approach was apparently taken by a district court
in United States v. Insurance Board. 8° In this case, a rule of the defen-
dant insurance trade association had excluded from the association
both agencies of mutual insurance companies - and agencies that repre-
sented stock and mutual companies simultaneously. Retention of mem-
bership in the association was contingent upon a member's refusing to
deal with mutual insurance companies." Upon leaving the association,
however, a member could continue to represent those stock insurance
companies which he formerly had represented. The government alleged
that the rule constituted a per se illegal refusal to deal."
The court held that since there was no evidence either that the
mutual insurance companies had sustained a loss as a result of this rule
or that there had been coercion of association members or mutual com-
panies, the rule of reason had to be applied in order to determine"
whether the rule constituted an illegal restraint of trade." The court
stated:
Coercive economic pressure affects the degree of restraint and
is frequently, if not always, a distinguishing characteristic of
concerted refusals to deal that are conclusively presumed to
be unlawful. The presence or absence of such element, there-
fore, would seem clearly to be relevant to the issue whether
the restraint of a concerted refusal to deal is unreasonable
per se."
Since the primary objective of the rule that required members to refuse
representation of mutual companies was not clearly anticompetitive,
the court was forced to examine the facts for anticompetitive results.
Finding none, it concluded that the rule was not per se illegal.
The approach in Insurance Board, however, contrasts sharply with
that in Washington State Bowling Proprietors Association v. Pacific
Lanes, Inc." There the court found per se illegal trade association rules
which enforced boycotts of competitors of the association members.
The plaintiff, a bowling establishment owner, alleged that three bowling
85 188 F. Supp. 949 (ND. Ohio 1960).
81 Id. at 952-53.
82 Id. at 950.
83 Id. at 955.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
83 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966).
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proprietors' associations had conducted tournaments under an eligibility
rule which made them open only to bowlers who restricted their league
and tournament play to establishments whose proprietors were members
of these associations. 8° The defendant associations claimed that the pur-
pose of the eligibility rule was to eliminate cheating on scores by insur-
ing that all professional competition was conducted pursuant to their
standardized scoring procedures. Yet the obvious effect of this eligibility
rule was to deprive nonassociation lanes of the lucrative professional
league and tournament business. The rule coerced those bowlers who
wanted to participate in the defendant association tournaments into
boycotting all other tournaments. The individual bowler was coerced
into choosing between member and nonmember tournaments. Here,
then, was clear coercive restraint of trade. The court held that these
trade abuses did not justify private regulations which restrained trade,
citing Fashion Originators' to support its holding.87
Coercion such as that in Pacific Lanes did not exist in Insurance
Board. The agencies in that case could continue to represent the stock
insurance companies they formerly had represented even though they
were no longer members of the trade association. It is submitted, then,
that the existence of economic coercion resulting from an association's
refusal to deal appears to be an essential prerequisite for the applica-
tion of a per se rationale, especially when the purpose of the refusal is
arguably not anticompetitive. In the absence of coercion, the rule of
reason may be applied.
CONCLUSION
The per se doctrine in group boycott-concerted refusal to deal
situations has recently been more specifically defined in several lower
federal court decisions to require a finding either of anticompetitive
intent or, in the absence of a clear showing of that intent, of a coercive
or exclusionary effect upon competition. The early Supreme Court
group boycott decisions had impliedly recognized these requirements
yet failed to articulate them. In later decisions the Supreme Court, faced
with situations having a substantial effect upon competition, disregarded
possible justifications without discussing the importance of anticom-
petitive intent to the per se rule. The recent lower court decisions in-
volving the possibility of diverse motives for a concerted refusal to deal
have reemphasized the need to establish anticompetitive intent before
holding a restraint per se illegal. When the presence of a primary intent
to supress or curtail competition is difficult to discern, the existence of
86 Id. at 374.
Bt Id. at 376.
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economic coercion may make the per se rationale applicable. When both
coercion and a primary anticompetitive motive are absent, however,
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